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ABSTRACT
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are a type of Industrial Con-
trol System (ICS) that both monitor and control the critical infrastructure that delivers man-
ufactured goods, water, and energy. These systems are responsible for supervising everything
from natural gas valves to electric substations. For the past half century, SCADA and ICS
networks have been proprietary, closed systems, entirely contained within a private network.
Their security was derived from air gap networking, physically isolating these systems from the
Internet. However, system operators are increasingly opting to connect their control systems
to Internet or corporate intranet networks in order to substantially reduce operating costs and
improve reporting capabilities. This architecture change has given rise to a new and poorly
understood class of risk.
In this work, we examine how a security concept known as Active Device Authentication
can be applied to the SCADA system threat model. As our contribution, we develop a software
tool known as Gatekeeper that wraps Active Device Authentication capabilities around exist-
ing, weaker authentication mechanisms present in off-the-shelf HMI software written in Java.
This work aims to provide the reader with a stronger understanding of the concept of Active
Device Authentication, and how it can be deployed into legacy, proprietary, or mission-critical
environments to enable additional security controls without risk of impacting the underlying
systems’ reliability.
1CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND
1.1 SCADA Control System Security
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are defined as systems used
to control dispersed assets using a centralized system to collect data and control corresponding
components, Stouffer et al. (2011). These systems are rapidly being integrated into the public
Internet. On December 7, 2007 the president signed the Energy Independence and Security
Act into law, Independence (2007). Under this new act, the Department of Energy, along with
several other organizations and agencies, were given the monumental task of modernizing the
US power grid. This has lead to creation of “third generation SCADA”, or Internet connected
critical infrastructure systems, Cai et al. (2008). As these systems become increasingly in-
terconnected with the rest of the world, their attack surface and the corresponding security
implications drastically change.
Over the past decade, the amount of computing resources, number of attack tools, and
network speeds are all increasing, while the IPv4 address space is not. In September of 2013,
HD Moore, the creator of the Metasploit security toolset, stated that “The IPv4 internet is
more of a kiddie pool than this nebulous unknowable thing anymore” Moore (2013). Moore
correctly observes that the modern attacker has the ability to enumerate specific vulnerabilities
and services across the entire IPv4 space in an alarmingly short timespan. It is no longer a
question of whether misconfigured and vulnerable pieces of a critical infrastructure will be
discovered, but when they will be found (and by whom). For example, the Zmap project
from the University of Michigan is capable of scanning the entirety of the IPv4 address space
in under an hour from a single machine with a gigabit internet connection, Durumeric et al.
(2013). Obscurity can no longer be an assumed defense mechanism of Internet connected
2infrastructure. These network-facing systems are likely to be probed on a regular basis, even
daily, Cai et al. (2008). SCADA systems are, for the moment, surprisingly under-equipped to
handle this new threat, which could, and likely will, have costly real-world ramifications.
In this work, we will cover the current security posture and implications of third generation
ICS and SCADA systems, which are characterized by having Intranet connectivity. We will
discuss common configurations found in SCADA and industrial control systems, security issues
of these configurations, including current protection and mitigation strategies recommended by
ICS-CERT and other authorities. This paper will attempt to show that these recommended
security controls, while valid, can still be circumvented.
Next we propose a novel concept that will further secure a critical element of industrial
control systems, the human-machine interface. Our research will demonstrate protecting the
HMI component by actively collecting data about end user’s systems accessing the SCADA
network. Since legacy, proprietary, HMI systems were not designed with security in mind,
authentication logic must be added as a layer on top of the original software system. By inject-
ing logic to actively fingerprint the client system we can gather data that has been previously
unattainable in traditional intrusion and anomaly detection systems. The enriched information
obtained from a connecting client’s system is used to more accurately determine the validity
and authorization of the connecting device. We will refer to this technique as active device
authentication.
As a part of our evaluation, we show that even when authentication credentials for an
operator are compromised, a system is still able to accurately protect the HMI system from
unauthorized access. This is achieved by matching a whitelist of characteristics about a client’s
system, such as the MAC address, screen resolution, or operating system. This information,
now provided through the application layer, was previously unavailable to use for authenti-
cation. An active device authentication mechanism, when combined with industry standard
security practices, will provide a greatly increased defensive posture without hindering system
performance or accessibility. This work also demonstrates that current security controls and
procedures alone are not enough to protect against a persistent and determined hacker, or
nation-state attack.
3While the solution outlined in this paper is inimitable; the problem explored in it is hardly
new. At its core, there is a dispute of usability, performance, and uptime versus the security
and integrity of a system. In the SCADA world, for example, it is not uncommon for a firewall
to fail open when receiving more packets than it can process, to prevent time sensitive and
mission critical data from being dropped. As more layers and complexity are added to this
system or network, the possibility arises of it becoming less user-friendly, and potentially less
functional. Many control system networks rely on real-time data transmission and computing,
which cannot withstand such outages caused by stringent security measures. In fact, a brief
glance into the priorities of a SCADA or HMI network operator will reveal their values to
typically be the exact opposite of the traditional Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
model of security, Wang and Lu (2013). The challenge then lies within security professionals
to provide thorough, layered, and robust security for some of the most critical information
systems in the world without impeding performance or availability.
1.2 Current Landscape of SCADA Networks
The topological layout of control system networks varies widely, however there are a few
common consistencies in the design. NIST and ICS-CERT have published several detailed ICS
network designs. For the context of this work, these theoretical network implementations will
be used as a basis to demonstrate the capabilities of an active defense approach to authentica-
tion and authorization. First we will describe several of these common network architectures,
followed by the importance and challenges of protecting them. The goal of this section is to
show that while there are currently many protection mechanisms on a power system network,
in many cases it is still trivial for an attacker to reach an HMI console. Finally, we will discuss
the importance of placing an additional protection mechanism, proposed later in this work,
closer to the information it is protecting. This layered protection will greatly add to the overall
effectiveness of a comprehensive security strategy.
The network layout in Figure 1.1 includes several firewalls between the sensitive internal
SCADA network and the public Internet. At minimum one firewall system will be incorporated
into most designs.
4Figure 1.1 Two Firewall SCADA Network Architecture, US ICS-CERT
The corporate network commonly includes several common systems such as email, web
services, and employee workstations that are on many typical office intranet networks. It is
important to note that the information systems in the business network will conform to separate
uptime, maintenance, and security standards from the internal control system network. At
first glance, this network may seem fairly secure. With two firewalls, network administrators
are able to create multiple sets of access control lists (ACL) to block malicious traffic and
easily segment access to sections of the network. Without direct access, this layout creates a
considerable challenge for an attacker looking to access the control system network. However,
it is not immune to penetration.
An attacker will begin intrusion by targeting services advertised publicly through the cor-
porate firewall. Next, the attacker will attempt to compromise a machine on the corporate
network, whether by phishing or some other mechanism. Once this task has been completed,
the attacker will begin the scanning and enumeration process in order to understand the in-
ternal network. An adversary will be able to pivot to weaker systems once inside the network,
allowing greater access and the ability to find and compromise a machine that has access to
systems and services on the secondary control system network. For example, an attacker can
compromise an insecure application on the corporate web server; from that entry point, the
attacker may scan for an outdated operating system to exploit. After finding and compromising
one or more systems, the attacker can pivot into a system with access to the production control
system LAN.
5While this scenario appears difficult to exploit, it is in fact much simpler than one might
expect. The corporate systems that connect to the Internet provide significant attack surface.
Web servers, due to the inherent nature of being public internet facing, are one of the easier
systems on a network to exploit. Custom web applications will likely provide plenty of op-
portunities to gain access through one of several common and easily detected programming
errors. Employees using the corporate network also pose one of the greatest security risks. A
joint study between Google and UC San Diego showed the astonishing effectiveness of targeted
phishing attacks. Multiple assessments indicated an average 13.7% success rate against selected
victims, with some assessments returning as high as 45%. What is even more astounding is
the rate at which attackers utilize access obtained through phishing. As part of background re-
search conducted during the same study, it was found that 50% of the credentials obtained were
utilized by attackers within 7 hours, with 20% being consumed within 30 minutes Bursztein
et al. (2014). A similar study with USB flash drives was conducted with an estimated attack
success rate of 45%-98% with the first drive being activated in less than 6 minutes, Tischer
et al. (2016). In fact, Stuxnet, one of the most widely cited cyber-physical attacks leveraged
traditional USB based malware self-replication logic to jump between air gapped networks,
Langner (2013). When the preceding facts are considered, it becomes increasingly hard to ar-
gue that a simple and common network security setup, such as the one depicted in Figure 1.1,
can be sufficient for use in SCADA systems.
In the second example of an ICS network layout, the topology is very similar to Figure 1.1
with one very significant difference. The internal production control system network is ac-
cessible through the firewall using a virtual private network connection or VPN. Similar to
the previous example, an attacker can take several approaches to compromising the necessary
credentials to login to the VPN application. For the scope of this paper we will make the
postulation that this breach in security is possible.
With complete access to the internal ICS network through VPN, the attacker’s system
may as well be physically plugged into the same network switch as other equipment. Many of
the attacks, network scans, and exploits against the Human Machine Interface that would be
stopped by the ICS firewall in Figure 1.1 are now possible in Figure 1.2. One of the simplest
6Figure 1.2 Firewall System with VPN Access, US ICS-CERT
attacks to accomplish is ARP cache poisoning. With this attack, devices on the LAN are tricked
into thinking an attackers laptop is the correct destination for network packets. This can be
utilized to intercept and read all the packets destined for the Human Machine Interface. This
attack has the capability to block important or time sensitive communications and capture
credentials being transmitted through the network, Wang and Lu (2013). At this stage the
malicious actor is able to freely access the HMI console and manipulate data on the ICS network
without any restrictions, and with the ability to utilize the VPN have guaranteed access around
any perimeter security devices.
In Figure 1.3, the ICS network topology allows vendors to remotely assist control center
engineers and IT personnel with upgrades. In this scenario remote substations are attaining
access to the LAN with dial-up modems, and by VPN in more modern networks, ICS-CERT
(2016). As witnessed in the attacks against the Target Corporation, their most recent major
breach was caused by an HVAC vendor’s remote access to their internal network, Yadron
(2014). A vendor is not always bound with the same stringent policies and security controls as
a critical utility. This makes it possible, and even easier for an attacker to target the vendor
to steal login credentials to a remote SCADA network.
In each of these models is imperative to convey the significant level of risk that is inherent
in maintaining a complex information systems network. A company requires a large amount of
7Figure 1.3 Network dialup access, and vendor support, US ICS-CERT
capital resources, engineering hours, and software tools to develop a secure network. After an
immense amount of effort, an attacker only needs to find a single unpatched operating system,
misconfigured firewall, or vulnerable web application to gain complete access to an ICS network.
The interaction between defenders and attackers in cyberspace is highly asym-
metrical. A network administrator must be constantly on guard, and make a
large investment in software and appliances to secure the network from attack.
Information systems are highly complex, and understanding of their internals
and configuration is often highly compartmented. In many large organizations, a
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) must delegate security monitoring of
various systems to subordinates who are experts in those subject areas. In larger
networks, it might not be possible for a single network administrator, or even
a small team, to keep up with the constant stream of possible vulnerabilities to
defend against. Blakely (2012)
Add to this situation the stated primary objective in SCADA of availability over all else, and
it quickly becomes an uphill battle.
81.3 Change Management and Patching in SCADA Systems
SCADA networks have very different maintenance and upgrade policies than a standard
corporate network. Change management is a very difficult undertaking with these mission-
critical, high uptime systems. Architectures between competing ICS technologies are often
incompatible, and not interoperable. This creates a situation where patches for software bugs,
security flaws, or even new features rely heavily on the vendor’s discretion and capabilities to
fix. For these reasons many SCADA and ICS systems are purchased with a vendor agreement
for continued support. However, if a vendor is unable to provide a security patch for a particular
SCADA system in a timely manner it will likely have to remain online and vulnerable for a
prolonged period of time.
Applying upgrades to equipment on the control system network while minimizing outages
can be a complex process that often involves IT, security personnel, SCADA engineers, and
the vendor. SCADA equipment is both expensive and designed for a very specific purpose,
therefore the life cycle of these systems is intended to be much longer than an average IT
system. Tables 1.3 and 1.3 show the typical lifecycle being designed to last between 15 to
20 years. As a result of this paradigm the operating system powering the SCADA software
will be utilized well past the time in which it’s vendor is providing security patches. It is not
uncommon for example to still be using Windows XP despite Microsoft no longer officially
offering support, Stouffer et al. (2011).
According to the NIST report, a survey of a critical infrastructure network at a major power
provider revealed that their SCADA and ICS networks were connected, by some means, into
their corresponding corporate network. It can be generalized that a corporate network is likely
not up to security standards required to operate safety-critical systems. The requirements and
goals of an IT network are drastically different than a SCADA network. It was also noted by
NIST that those in upper management were not aware of the interconnectivity of business and
control system networks, Stouffer et al. (2011). It is inherently difficult to secure a network,
when those making decisions on how this network should be designed and protected are unaware
of the architecture and the related security implication of their interconnected systems.
9The implications of SCADA technology described above create a myriad of security con-
cerns. Network access to outdated systems, such as Windows XP, which no longer have vendor
support, generates a grave threat, as any newly discovered exploits will never be patched by
the official vendor. Any software bugs in the HMI application are completely dependent on the
ICS vendor providing timely updates.
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Table 1.1 Summary of IT and SCADA System Differences, NIST Guide
Category IT Systems Industrial Control Systems
Performance • Non-real-time
• Response must be consistent
• High throughput is demanded
• High delay and jitter may be ac-
ceptable
• Real-time
• Response is time-critical
• Modest throughput is acceptable
• High delay and/or jitter is not ac-
ceptable
Availability • Responses such as rebooting are
acceptable
• Availability deficiencies can often
be tolerated, depending on the sys-
tem’s operational requirements
• Responses such as rebooting may
not be acceptable because of process
availability requirements
• Availability requirements may ne-
cessitate redundant systems
• Outages must be planned and
scheduled days/weeks in advance
• High availability requires exhaus-
tive pre-deployment testing
Risk Management • Data confidentiality and integrity
is paramount
• Fault tolerance is less important
momentary downtime is not a major
risk
• Major risk impact is delay of busi-
ness operations
• Human safety is paramount, fol-
lowed by protection of the process
• Fault tolerance is essential, even
momentary downtime may not be
acceptable
• Major risk impacts are regulatory
non-compliance, environmental im-
pacts, loss of life, equipment, or pro-
duction
System Operation • Systems are designed for use with
typical operating systems
• Upgrades are straightforward
with the availability of automated
deployment tools
• Differing and possibly proprietary
operating systems, often without se-
curity capabilities built in
• Software changes must be care-
fully made, usually by software ven-
dors, because of the specialized con-
trol algorithms and perhaps modi-
fied hardware and software involved
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Table 1.1 (Continued)
Category IT Systems Industrial Control Systems
Change Management • Software changes are applied in
a timely fashion in the presence
of good security policy and proce-
dures. The procedures are often au-
tomated.
• Software changes must be thor-
oughly tested and deployed incre-
mentally throughout a system to en-
sure that the integrity of the control
system is maintained. ICS outages
often must be planned and sched-
uled days/weeks in advance. ICS
may use OSs that are no longer sup-
ported
Component Lifetime • Lifetime on the order of 3-5 years • Lifetime on the order of 15-20
years
Managed Support • Managed Support • Service support is usually via a
single vendor
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CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Human Machine Interface Risk Assessment
Similarly with network designs, HMI software also varies widely by vendor. HMI software
has gone through significant changes in recent years to be more inline with the objectives of third
generation ICS networks. Early HMI implementations often had a specific computer system
with proprietary software installed, which was directly connected to the ICS network. During
this time, being inside an air-gap network design inherently protected the critical infrastructure
systems and HMI console, Urias et al. (2012). Many SCADA protocols and ICS software suits
at this time were designed without implementing basics security measures. For example, the
original design of DNP3 does not include any authentication to send or receive packets as part
of the protocol. This allows an attacker to easily craft a custom DNP packet or replay packets
captured across a LAN. After gaining initial access to an internal network, an attackers work
to compromise functionality in a SCADA environment becomes trivial. However, at that time
security was not, and probably did not need to be the primary objective to keep systems online
and safe in the air-gap topology. While the impact of a breach in this isolated scenario is still
very high, the risk would remain low, as it requires physical access to the system or network.
In fact before 2001, half of the incidents reported to affect operation in SCADA systems were
attributed to human error from workers on site, Urias et al. (2012).
Over the past decade, increased broadband penetration, the industry trend of networking
remote systems, and demand by both engineers and business units for remote access to in-
formation within ICS systems has prompted a change in connectivity options, Stouffer et al.
(2011). With systems being rapidly connected to the Internet an entire new realm of security
challenges and breaches were introduced.
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Figure 2.1 Industrial Security Incidents by Year, NIST
The Human Machine Interaction software can be a dedicated machine in a control center
with firewall rules to allow remote access from business or VPN connections. The HMI console
also has the possibility to be a software package installed on a company laptop, which can
access the information anywhere inside the corporate, control system, or VPN network. Most
notably, and the focus of this research, modern HMI software is able to be setup to allow access
from a web browser by any information system connected to the Internet, Stouffer et al. (2011).
This final option provides the most flexibility and accessibility to engineers interacting with
internal systems, but with a huge security tradeoff. The risk and impact from vulnerabilities in
web based HMI software is drastically amplified by the increased attack surface of internet-wide
connectivity.
2.2 Intrusion Detection Systems in SCADA Networks
Traditional IT approaches can be implemented into a SCADA network in an attempt to
improve security and prevent unauthorized access. This section will explore how intrusion
detection systems (IDS) operate on a SCADA network. It will cover what type of data can be
gathered at the network layer by an IDS, and how this data can be used to enhance security
around and HMI application. Finally this section covers what gaps still exist when protecting
a web application when using an IDS system.
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Figure 2.2 Typical Network Topology for IDS Implementation
To utilize an IDS to its full potential when protecting a specific asset, such as an HMI
application, it should be topologically placed close to that asset on the SCADA network. This
allows the system to be tuned to specifically watch and filter traffic to specifically protect an
application. The more resources contained behind the IDS, the higher probability of being
affected by a false negative.
Figure 2.2 shows a typical setup where an IDS system is used to protect a specific web
application, in this instance an HMI web application. The firewall in this diagram is placed
behind the main router for the network. It will protect systems based on an access control
list or ACL. This list contains whitelisted IP addresses that are allowed to send traffic, and
the ports through which they can route traffic. This provides a first step and basic security
to the network, however its effectiveness is limited to information contained in the network
layer of the OSI model. The IDS system in Figure 2.2 is placed directly in front of the HMI
web application. Previously, we highlighted how attacker will often target a separate system
in a network and use that access to pivot into attack an HMI application from an internal
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network address. This IDS placement prevents that by further isolating the web server from
both external attacks and intrusion attempts from internal systems on the network, Rehman
(2003).
The intrusion detection system on the network can be tuned to detect signatures of malicious
traffic such as port scanning, a sudden increase in network packet rates that may result in denial
of service, or even as simple as sending alerts based on the network protocol used, Rehman
(2003). In an IDS these events are categorized using rule sets. Rules are a list of signatures that
match known traffic or attack patterns. Once a signature match occurs the IDS will perform
one or more of the following actions: blocking traffic from the source IP, alerting a system
administrator, or logging the event, SANS (2008).
Figure 2.3 Protocol Stack for SSL Traffic, MSDN (2016)
While these security methods by an IDS can aid in the detection of attack traffic on a
network they have several significant drawbacks when protecting a web based HMI applica-
tion. As best practice a web application should be protected with an SSL certificate. This
is especially important when the web server transmits important data in a SCADA network.
Having the HMI applications traffic contained inside an encrypted SSL connection will pre-
vent eavesdropping or man in the middle (MiTM) attacks. That encrypted channel will also
prevent the IDS from reading any data inside the application layer. This setup is visualized
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in Figure refssl-protocol-stack, as we can see the IDS will only be able to read the routing
information in the first three networking layers. If the a legitimate user’s credentials are stolen
through one of the attack scenarios outlined in Chapter 1, and the malicious actor is able to
spoof or connect from an acceptable IP address there is very little can IDS can do to prevent
the attack, SANS (2008). In the next chapter we will discuss inserting additional data into the
encrypted application layer, and describe how this data can be utilized to prevent an attack
that would be permitted by a standard IDS.
According to a report by NIST, a survey of a critical infrastructure network at a major
power provider revealed that their SCADA and ICS networks were connected, by some means,
into their corresponding corporate network. It can be generalized that a corporate network is
likely not up to security standards required to operate safety-critical systems. The requirements
and goals of an IT network are drastically different than a SCADA network. It was also noted
by NIST that those in upper management were not aware of the interconnectivity of business
and control system networks Stouffer et al. (2011). It is difficult to secure a network, when
those making the decisions on how this network should be designed and protected are unaware
of the architecture and the related security implication of their interconnected systems. Given
its level of access and ability to remotely interact with critical infrastructure systems, ICS-
CERT recognizes the HMI console as being one of the most valuable targets for an attacker to
obtain access ICS-CERT (2016). Defending an HMI system must also be given the same level
of diligence.
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CHAPTER 3. ACTIVE DEVICE AUTHENTICATION
As discussed previously, an Internet facing HMI console to access a utility’s critical inter-
nal systems presents a huge security challenge, especially when the software is created and
maintained by a third party. This often leads IT administrators with little or no ability to
provide additional security measures to the HMI application. Existing solutions are applied at
the IP network layer or above by attempting to put a firewall network boundary, or IDS in
front of the application. In the latter half of Chapter 1 we discussed how attackers are still
able to remotely gain access to applications, creating a need for further security beyond what
is currently available.
This chapter proposes a solution for access control and device authentication to a legacy
HMI console providing inadequate security or completely lacking security measures. The pro-
posed solution shows how to prevent unauthorized access from an attacker, even when a legiti-
mate username and password have been compromised through the use of multiple authentica-
tion challenges.
3.1 A Solution for Legacy Device Authentication
Our proposed device authentication technique involves injecting code into an HMI applica-
tion to add client fingerprinting and client-server authentication logic before allowing a client
to access sensitive data on the SCADA network. There are two components that comprise the
additional security measures, injected client-side code that is run to gather profile data about a
user’s system, and the server-side logic, which we call Gatekeeper, that checks the profile data
against a whitelist of known client profiles and reconfigures a firewall to allow the client access
to the SCADA network. Optionally, Gatekeeper’s whitelisting strategy could be replaced with
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an adaptive machine learning approach to incorporate networks that are highly dynamic and
prone to change.
Figure 3.1 Unprotected HMI Application
In Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 both the malicious actor and the legitimate user are able to
directly access the HMI application on an Internet facing network. Figure 3.2 demonstrates
the modified HMI application interacting with Gatekeeper. Note that the modified client is
only facilitating data collection for Gatekeeper. Gatekeeper maintains authority to fulfill or
reject client side requests with the SCADA network. If a malicious actor attempted to remove
or disable the HMI modifications Gatekeeper would have no reason to allow the client access
through the firewall. It is possible that an attacker would try to fake the client profile informa-
tion collected by the modified HMI application, but by increasing the number of profile data
points it becomes increasingly harder for an attacker to provide valid profiles.
The injected software security layer examines distinct sets of the client system information
for a connecting client that when combined together, creates a unique connection profile. This
connection profile is then evaluated by Gatekeeper’s whitelist and, if need be, various authen-
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Figure 3.2 Protected HMI Application
tication challenges (password or various two factor based authentication methods) are issued
to the modified HMI application to provide a means to grant access when new profiles are
detected. In this work we experimented with the following actively collected profile data shown
in Table 3.1.
Figure 3.3 shows the additional protection mechanisms added to the HMI application.
The HMI application, while still served to the client over the network in the same manner,
is now wrapped with logic to send client system profile information and relay user responses
to Gatekeeper’s authentication challenges. If a connected client fails multiple authentication
challenges, Gatekeeper notifies the network administrator of the suspicious activity.
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Table 3.1 Data Points Gathered from Client System
Metric Information about Metric Caveats about Metric
Username Name used to login to the remote com-
puter
None
Operating System Version information about the client’s sys-
tem
None
Java Version Used to run the provided JAR file This can change with system
updates
MAC Address Unique hardware identifier of the NIC None
Hostname End user’s system hostname None
Screen Resolution Screen size ex: 1440x900 Users may change their screen
size
IP Address The connecting clients IP address IP addresses will change as
users travel
Wireless MAC Wireless hardware address Not all devices have wireless
Figure 3.3 Device Authentication Server in SCADA Network
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CHAPTER 4. EVALUATION
This chapter evaluates a proof-of-concept implementation of the active device authentication
technique proposed in Chapter 3.
Several example HMI systems are freely available online for trial and testing, and can be
used to demonstrate our proposed security measures. At the time of this writing SourceForge,
one of the most popular open source code repositories, showed Java applets being one of the
most utilized language platforms in writing a web application based HMI console. Cisco’s
SCADA Honeynet project also leverages Java applets, which partially confirms this trend,
Pothamsetty (2016). While the solution in this paper can be deployed with for many other
programming languages and frameworks, we will focus on evaluating the technique for HMI
applications written in Java.
Java is a popular choice for Human Machine Interaction software as it is cross-platform,
and can be used to provide a robust, configurable graphical user interface to display status
information and allow operator interaction. Prior to 2015, when most major browsers collec-
tively disabled execution of even signed Java applets due to security concerns, Java applets
served over a network through a web page were a popular choice for connecting clients on the
network. This method also accommodated the trend of SCADA system operators being able
to perform tasks remotely. Access to the application is as simple as navigating to a URL in a
browser that supported Java. Since applets had be deprecated by most browsers during our
evaluation we ran the HMI Java applet as a Java application to proceed with the evaluation.
Java applets can be trivially modified to run as normal Java applications, so it is likely that
many legacy Java applets are still running today, despite legitimate security concerns.
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4.1 Gatekeeper Implementation
It is common knowledge in the web application security community that client-side valida-
tion, such as JavaScript checks, are not enough to stop an attacker. Any application presented
to a user has the potential to be modified or reverse engineered before use. Authentication
mechanism’s that rely on the integrity of client-side application checks can be easily invali-
dated. For evaluation in this work, a server side authentication application named Gatekeeper
was designed (outlined in Chapter 3). Knowledge and device challenges presented to a user
have to be verified by the Gatekeeper software before a system is allowed access to a data source
for the HMI application.
Gatekeeper is a Python application written on top of the Flask framework. It provides
API endpoints to receive system profile information from a client attempting to run an HMI
application. The information received is checked against a whitelist of known profiles. If the
profile is not found in the whitelist, the session is issued an authentication challenge before it
is allowed to connect to the network. In the current implementation, authentication challenges
consist of either a username and password pair or an SMS based two-factor authentication.
The complete source code to Gatekeeper is available at: https://github.com/mschlue/
gatekeeper.
4.2 HMI Application Modifications
The Java application for a HMI system is comprised of a series of compiled class files and
archived in a JAR file. A typical distribution method is to deploy the JAR file to a web server,
to be downloaded and executed by the user.
Gatekeeper expects clients to send a specific list of system profile information. Since the
legacy HMI application does not include logic to interact with Gatekeeper this logic must be
injected into the compiled proprietary HMI application. In this evaluation, JReFrameworker
https://github.com/benjholla/JReFrameworker, a bytecode manipulation framework was
used to inject the system profiling and GUI logic for responding to Gatekeeper authentication
challenges.
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4.3 Active Device Authentication Proof-of-Concept
During our survey of open source SCADA applications we discovered a sample interface for
a hypothetical SCADA application released by GenLogic available at: http://www.GenLogic.
com/java2/scada_viewer.html. The application is typical of larger complex software projects
in that it uses multiple libraries, static resource files, and contains complex user interactions.
To begin our evaluation we first compiled the application (to simulate a lack of source code,
which is the case for most legacy proprietary HMI applications). We then injected the system
profiling logic into the startup routine of the compiled application using JReFrameworker.
JReFrameworker allowed us to quickly create a project containing the source code of the logic
we wanted to inject into the compiled application. The system profiling logic injected into the
GenLogic SCADA demonstration application in this evaluation collects the username, operating
system, Java version, mac address, hostname, and IP address of the client machine. In addition
to injecting system profiling logic we also injected user interface code to facilitate responding
to Gatekeeper authentication challenges.
In Figure 4.1 we can observe that the unmodified Java application immediately starts and
is available for interaction from a user. This is an example of an application that is likely
to be running on an internal network. The application itself does not provide any protection
mechanisms and relies on network and system administrators to create access policies and
firewall rules for protection. As mentioned in Chapter 1 these rules can be defeated by an
attacker, and we therefore need to inject application layer active device authentication.
When running the updated HMI application the collected information is sent in a JSON
over an HTTP POST request to the Gatekeeper authentication server. An example JSON
payload sent to the application includes: {“mac”: “00:50:56:8e:4c:67”, “os”: “Mac OS X”,
“java version”: “1.8.0 60-b27”, “hostname”: “LS2-00391”, “username”: “matthewschlue”}.
In the first transaction all of the supplied information from the modified HMI application is
contained in the whitelist of the Gatekeeper authentication server. The outcome of this is a
successful authentication attempt that grants the user access. Figure 4.2 shows the device
authentication transaction from the point of view of the authentication server’s logs.
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Figure 4.1 Unprotected HMI Application - GenLogic
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In the second payload sent, a bad hostname was passed into the authentication server.
Figure 4.3 shows the auth server individually checking each metric passed to the server. When
the hostname check failed, the remaining checks immediately stopped and the connected user
was prompted for a two-factor challenge. In this case the two-factor challenge was a unique
one time link sent by SMS to the user’s mobile phone shown in Figure 4.5. When the challenge
received the correct response shown in Figure 4.4 the user was allowed to connect to the network.
The third scenario an attacker does not have the proper device profile and fails the host-
name check against their machine. It is important to note that the values submitted to the
authentication server in this scenario may be spoofed if the attacker had the skill to reverse
engineer the applet before running it. Even with spoofed values the attacker still fails one of
the system metrics and is prompted for a two-factor authentication code. Upon being unable
to provide the second authentication factor, the attacker is given a 403 HTTP response, and
the Gatekeeper server refuses to allow access to the offending system’s IP address.
Figure 4.2 Client With Passing Host Metrics
Figure 4.3 Client Prompted For Two-Factor Authentication
From the point of view of the HMI user, there will not be any perceived differences when
starting the application if their system profile is whitelisted by gatekeeper. If a host check is
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Figure 4.4 Successful Two-Factor Authentication
Figure 4.5 Two-Factor Authentication Token
Figure 4.6 Client Failing Two-Factor Authentication
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Figure 4.7 HMI Application Two-Factor Prompt
failed during this evaluation a two-factor screen is show to a user before login. After providing
the proper code, a user is allowed access to the application.
There are several security advantages that are immediately realized in this experiment when
implementing this the active device authentication mechanisms. The authentication server
allows the administrator to more robustly log authentication attempts to the HMI applet. A
proprietary HMI console won’t always contain the relevant logs an administrator will need to
access ongoing login attempts to an application.
The data points collected in this application are relatively easy for a skilled hacker to
change on their system, however it is very difficult to forge proper device credentials. Initially
the attacker may not realize their machine is essentially being man in the middled and tested
for device authentication. This may slow down a malicious actor, but seldom will they stop at
the first road block. Java decompilers such as the one listed at http://jd.benow.ca/ provide a
quick way for the attacker to decompile a Java class file and discover the data being collected.
Knowing what system data is being collected isn’t the same as knowing the unique values
required for device authentication. Now, along with having a valid username and password an
attacker also has nine additional pieces of information they need to correctly provide. A brute
force attempt against the authentication server, while probable, is very unlikely to succeed
before detection. This difficulty is compounded if an attacker has to switch IP addresses after
each unsuccessful attempt. In this scenario if the time to detection plus the time to mitigation
is less than the time to reverse engineer and brute force the authentication system, we can
properly protect the HMI application.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION
5.1 Summary
Current third generation SCADA networks have repurposed outdated and existing sys-
tems, placing them on the publicly accessible locations of the Internet or corporate intranets.
Chapter 1 elaborates on the significant gaps in the current security posture of these newly
connected networks and surveys current security landscape in both SCADA networks and HMI
applications. Chapter 2 reviews current security mechanisms, including firewalls and intrusion
detection systems, and concludes that these techniques alone are no longer potent enough to
stop a malicious actor. Chapter 3 presents active device authentication, as a technique that
combines an intelligent firewall with HMI application code injection to gather client-side system
profile data and facilitate authentication challenge-response logic in legacy HMI applications.
Finally, chapter 4 demonstrates the feasibility of active device authentication by implement-
ing Gatekeeper and modifying the compiled binary of an open source demonstration SCADA
application originally distributed as a Java applet.
5.2 Discussion and Future Work
The enhanced approach to security introduced in this paper takes protection a step further
by adding data collection mechanisms in the application layer of an Internet facing HMI ap-
plication. These mechanisms collect and relay unique information about the computer system
attempting to access the HMI application. This information is evaluated by a server on the
SCADA network against a whitelist of known device profiles. If the connecting system is unable
to pass the newly embedded security checks its IP address is not allowed access to the SCADA
network. One concern with this approach is the tendency of security to fail closed, while recent
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trends in reliable computing (such as SCADA systems) is to fail open. In mission critical sit-
uations that added security layer may actually be viewed as a hinderance to the network. We
would comment on this view by noting that the action taken by Gatekeeper could be modified
to simply notify the network operators of the suspicious activity (now detectable as a result of
the security layer) and continue to fail open until a decision is made by a human operator.
This paper has proven the ability to increase security on a legacy HMI application by inject-
ing logic for system profiling and facilitating authentication challenge-responses. An important
area of work that is left as an open problem in this paper is testing these protection mechanisms
in several large scale, live SCADA testbeds. As noted in Chapter 1, SCADA system’s depend
on high reliability and uptime. While the gatekeeper application proved to add security with
demo applications it is important that it is tested in a live environment where any adverse
affects can be measured.
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